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My text contains more questions than answers, and the answers are only speculative. My first question is: ‘Whose turn to practice took place in 2001?’ The text contains a short review of various meanings of the term in different disciplines. From there 
I move to the second question, which I find especially relevant for my discipline: manage-
ment and organization studies. ‘Is ‘reflective practitioner’ an oxymoron?’ I set Niklas Luh-
mann against Donald Schön in my search for an answer. The third question is: ‘How can 
bridges between practitioners and theoreticians of management be (re)built?’ 
My first encounter with ‘practice’
In the early 1970s, economists from Warsaw School of Economics active within the 
research program ‘Functioning, organization and further development of Polish retail’ 
(Beksiak 1978), established contacts with management scholars at the University of 
Gothenburg. (As usual, these contacts grew from personal connections and interests, 
which are of no relevance here.) It was partly this encounter that led the project direc-
tor, Professor Janusz Beksiak, to the conclusion that economic models, this peculiar 
kind of science fiction, provide no information about the way economic decisions are 
made in practice. The Swedish colleagues were interested in these specific matters, and 
in order to continue contacts and exchanges, similar studies had to be made. Alien to 
fieldwork techniques, Professor Beksiak employed me, a psychologist trained in such 
approaches, as a methodological consultant (Beksiak and Czarniawska 1977). The 
results differed dramatically from the predictions of the theoretical models of (social-
ist) economies; the latter, surprisingly enough, were quite consistent with what was 
practiced in large US corporations (Czarniawska 1985). For me, the future direction 
became obvious: Since that first Polish project, I studied managerial practices in the 
USA, Italy, and Sweden. 
Imagine my surprise in 2001 when I encountered a volume edited by Theodore 
Schatzki et al., entitled The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory; it summarized con-
tributions to the 1996 conference ‘Practices and Social Order’ at the University of Biele-
feld. As far as I could see, most of management and organization researchers (with the 
few exceptions of few scholars who still believed in the design of perfect structures) 
studied organizing and management in practice. So what was the turn all about?
Commentary
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Whose practice? Which theory?
I could see at least three explanations for this surprising ‘turn.’ The first was linguistic. 
In Polish, as in Swedish, the term ‘practice’ is used either as the opposite of ‘theory’ 
or as a way of indicating activities of professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. The 
word ‘practices’ in plural is a synonym in Polish for various acts of cheating, and in 
Swedish, depending on the accent, it means ‘practitioners.’ Thus both Swedes and 
Poles often used the Latin-German ‘praxis’ to describe what we studied. (Observe 
that in English common usages of the plural are quite similar.) Thus ‘the turn to prac-
tice’ could be a linguistic turn in Anglo-Saxon social sciences, where the term would 
be now used as the equivalent of the German ‘praxis’ (notice that the conference 
took place in Bielefeld, and one of the organizers and book editors was Karin Knorr 
Cetina).1 
Another reason for announcing the turn could have been related to the fact that 
the conference participants were sociologists who, like economists, are fonder of the-
ory than of practice. The contribution of a philosopher gave weight and legitimacy 
to the interest in practice, and French participants in particular had no difficulty in 
finding predecessors in the pragmatist French thought—from Bourdieu through Cal-
lon and Latour to Boltanski and Thévenot. Thus for the French scholars ‘the practice 
turn’ was at least two decades old, but in 1996/2001 it finally reached Anglo-Saxon 
waters.
The third reason could be that most social sciences and writers in most languages 
have long used the term ‘practice’ and ‘practices,’ but with many different meanings, 
contributing to obfuscation rather than enlightenment. Such, at least, was the opinion of 
Paul Rabinow, which I found instructive:
Although the theme of ‘practice’ has been central to American cultural anthropology 
for almost a decade now, it is rarely defined with any rigor. Sherry Ortner (1984: 149) 
makes this point: ‘What is a practice? In principle, the answer to this question is almost 
unlimited: anything people do. Given the centrality of domination in the model, how-
ever, the most significant forms of practice are those with intentional or unintentional 
political implications. Then again, almost anything people do has such implications. So 
the study of practice is after all the study of all forms of human action, but from a par-
ticular—political—angle.’ I take a different approach, one that is less general and that 
takes up practices from a different angle, the ethical rather than the political. (Rabinow 
1997, p. 195)
In order to elaborate his ethical approach, Rabinow supported his argument with 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1981, p. 187) definition of practice:
(…) any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of 
that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not 
an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game 
of football is, and so is chess.
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Rabinow thus commented on MacIntyre’s definition:
The language of the definition is full of terms (form, coherence, excellence, and so forth) 
one rarely if ever finds in contemporary social sciences. The reason for this unfamiliarity 
is that MacIntyre draws his terms from an older vocabulary and tradition, one that exists 
today as a minor current in moral philosophy, that of the virtues. (Rabinow 1997, p. 195)
Although I have some fear of stepping up on the high horses of a political and/or ethical 
stance (as a student of a practice of management—another way of limiting the term—I 
have neither a political nor a moral mandate to do so), I am fond of MacIntyre’s defini-
tion because it engages this aspect of the term ‘practice’ that in fact has to do with striv-
ing for excellence: ‘You need to practice more’; ‘She must yet do her daily practice,’ but 
sets it firmly in a social context (throwing ball skillfully is not an example of a practice; 
the game of ball is). I use it in a shortened version: ‘any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excel-
lence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity.’ But, one 
may ask, what about non-humans? Are they to be out of the picture once more?
A turn to practice in an ANT-ian mode
In the introduction to The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, Schatzki wrote:
… there is no unified practice approach. Most thinkers who theorize practices conceive 
of them, minimally, as arrays of activity. Not only, however, do their conceptions of activ-
ity and what connects activities vary, but some theorists define practices as the skills, or 
tacit knowledges and presuppositions, that underpin activities (e.g. Turner 1994; Dreyfus 
1991). Most theorists, moreover, above all those in philosophy and the traditional social 
sciences, identify the activities involved as those of persons: practices are arrays of human 
activity. A significant ‘posthumanist’ minority centered in science and technology studies 
avers, however, that the activities bound into practices also include those of nonhumans 
such as machines and the objects of scientific investigation. (Schatzki 2001, p. 2)
In the remainder of the text, Schatzki acknowledged the point made by the ‘posthuman-
ist minority’: ‘A central core (…) of practice theorists conceives of practices as embodied, 
materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practi-
cal understanding’ (ibid.) And perhaps even MacIntyre’s definition can be reconciled 
with the precepts of scholars of science and technology that insist on a symmetric treat-
ment of all ‘actants’—human and nonhuman agents—involved in an activity (see, e.g., 
Latour 1993). 
As I see it, MacIntyre’s practice is certainly realized with the cooperation of things 
and machines; yet a question remains if the vocabulary of virtues can be applied to 
machines as well. It has certainly been used in this way in science fiction, where robots, 
avatars, and computers can be ‘excellent’ and ‘evil’; ANT (actor-network theory) has 
its roots in narratology, so why not? Notice also that MacIntyre (who demonstrated 
a great interest in the phenomenon of modern management) plays in his definition on 
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the meaning of the word ‘goods.’ A practice may produce concrete effects in terms of 
material products, even commodities ‘goods,’ but these products also have a moral or 
aesthetic value: they must be ‘good.’ It is the practitioners who define—and redefine 
through practice—the meaning of ‘good.’ One can imagine that the concept of ‘good’ 
as conceived by classical musicians differs from that shared by rappers. Machines can 
evaluate human performance, and vice versa. If the quest for betterment can be seen as 
human, certain aspects of performance—the ability to compute complex calculations 
instantly, for example—belong only to machines. Machines can be good; they can be 
excellent; they can be improved upon; they also can evaluate human performance in the 
same terms (although usually put in a numerical form). The symmetry is maintained, 
but symmetrical parts need not be identical. What is important is, on the one hand, Ma-
cIntyre’s emphasis on the necessary sociality of practice, an emphasis that is also central 
to ANT type of approaches; and, on the other, his introduction of the vocabulary of 
virtues, absent from ANT. Yet ‘goodness’ and ‘excellence’ are key aspects of the common 
human and non-human practices.
As I pointed out at the outset, whereas the symmetry requirement was a novelty in 
management and organization studies, the turn to practice was not. What plagues the 
contemporary scholarship in my discipline is the growing chasm between theory and 
practice. To put it bluntly, the discipline (if this hybrid field deserves such a label) that 
was founded on the assumption of the utility of its theory to management practice is 
now increasingly ignored by the practitioners, who prefer to listen to consultants’ story-
telling than to theories, no matter how practice oriented.
Is ‘reflective practitioner’ an oxymoron?
As I see it, nothing announced such ‘turn away from theory.’ Kurt Lewin’s dictum ‘There 
is nothing more practical than a good theory’ (1952, p. 169) began to be doubted. Was 
the statement wrong, or are theories are not good enough? Argyris and Schön (1974) 
noted that, in practice, two kinds of theory may operate: ‘espoused theories’ (those re-
vealed in interviews with practitioners) and ‘theories-in-use’ (those that can be deduced 
from observations of actual practices).2 While the espoused theories tend to be versions 
of, or at least allude to, rationalist models of decision making, theories-in-use are more 
or less descriptions of successful tinkering (in the vocabulary of Knorr Cetina 1981), 
most often unverbalized by their practitioners. 
Managers do reflect-in-action, but they seldom reflect on their reflection-in-action. Hence 
this crucially important dimension of their art tends to remain private and inaccessible to 
others. (Schön 1984, p. 243) 
Thus Schön suggested that such theories-in-use should be made explicit, and this can be 
achieved by educating reflexive practitioners (Schön 1987). 
But can managers be taught to reflect on their reflection-in-action? According to 
Niklas Luhmann (1998), only on the condition that the practitioners alternate between 
acting and reflecting; it is impossible to do both at the same time. The world as seen by 
actors is necessarily unlike the world seen by observers. Observers are able to see op-
tions—and to distinguish among them, but not enough for a decision to act. As many 
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studies in my field have shown, the best way to paralyze action is to start a proper deci-
sion-making process. Actions stem from resolutions, not from decisions understood as 
acts of choice. Actors can see diverse options only in the moment of reflection, of observ-
ing, of not acting. Schön’s way out was the postulate that reflective practitioners must 
therefore develop ‘a double vision’ (Schön 1983, p. 164). However, the very awareness 
of an alternative would be paralyzing: ‘Even Buridan’s ass, placed, as it were, between 
two equally tempting bales of hay, will survive, even if it notices that it cannot decide, 
for that is why it decides nevertheless!’ (Luhmann 1995, p. 360).3 Contradiction—in 
life and in science—puts a stop to observation and demands action; observation can be 
made at a distance only, establishing distinctions until they become paradoxical; then it 
is time to come closer and start acting.
But even if Luhmann was right and Schön was wrong, it would seem that a neat 
division of work is still possible: Scholars observe, practitioners act; scholars point out 
paradoxes, practitioners deparadoxify (Czarniawska 1997); scholars offer feedback that 
helps practitioners to improve their action, to achieve ‘their standards of excellence.’ So, 
why consultants instead of theoreticians? Are their theories ‘better?’
Niklas Luhmann (1989/2005) was one of the few theoretical sociologists who paid 
any serious attention to management consultants (perhaps because he experienced man-
agement practice himself?). Still, he doubted if the messages delivered by consultants ar-
rive to clients in the form in which they were sent, whether they claim to deliver a theory 
or to instigate a practice. He questioned the possibility of a successful communication 
between consultants and their clients, as, in his view, their acts of communication form 
two distinct and closed systems. Such systems can only reproduce themselves, according 
to their blueprint, or ‘DNA’—thus the term ‘autopoiesis.’ Although all energy systems 
are open systems (there is no perpetuum mobile), all communication systems are auto-
poietic (Luhmann 1995). 
A communicative event consists of information, utterance, and meaning. Although 
the information transmitted and received may be identical, and although all parties may 
perceive the fact of the utterance, the meaning will be produced (a sense will be made 
of the utterance) within the system. Such internal communications can concern only 
what belongs to the system itself. Any communication arriving from the outside would 
become something else when internally processed (Luhmann 1989/2005). The systems 
can shout to each other, but what reaches them is but a reflection of their own voices.
That a group of consultants […] cannot communicate itself completely (but is nonetheless 
capable of communicating internally about this impossibility of external communication) 
is due to the fact that communication is the operation by means of which the group car-
ries its own autopoiesis, and thus the means by which it regenerates its own unity, as well 
as the difference between this unity and its environment. (Luhmann 1989/2005, p. 355)
Seen from this viewpoint, managers and consultants are unable to understand one 
another; they live in two closed (communication) worlds that never intersect. So, 
yes, consultants, who see themselves merely as observers of other actors, continue 
to plough through, unaware of the contradictions between their theories and their 
practices. They fail to see that they are actors rather than observers of their own prac-
tice (Luhmann 1995). Karin Fernler (1993) reported that management consultants 
interviewed by her study were actually upset by the idea that they should apply their 
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advice to their own company. Like every other actor, consultants have a blind spot 
where their own practice is concerned, but their practices are observed by their clients 
who, Luhmann has suggested, actually select them on the basis of their blind spots 
(Luhmann 1989/2005). In fact, the reform program offered by consultants studied by 
Fernler sold very well.
Furthermore, the unsuccessful communication does not mean that management 
consulting is useless. According to Luhmann, the attempts at communication produced 
by management consultants serve as an irritant to the client system. Consultants do not 
‘know better’; they are able to observe the actors, and see them in another light than 
the actors when they try to observe themselves. It is this difference in the observation 
points that can become ‘irritating, stimulating, and eventually productive’ (Luhmann 
1989/2005, p. 364). Left to themselves, clients would be enacting their own visions of 
the world, perhaps until some crisis stopped them. Irritated by consultants, the clients 
may themselves arrive at a new and brilliant solution to their problems—solutions that 
still conform to the main traits of the system. Luhmann has also suggested that success-
ful consultants do not point out blind spots in client’s observations, as researchers often 
attempt to do, but merely emphasize the difference between their observations and those 
of the clients.
Herein probably lies the difference in success between the two groups of observers: 
consultants and researchers. As I pointed out in another context, consultants engage in 
the ‘logic of practice,’4 helping to develop it without ever stating it explicitly. Also, and 
this in my opinion is very important, they help to formulate representation statements, 
which actually mask the logic of practice according to the representation rules sanc-
tioned by a given social order. It can be said that they deliver theories to be espoused, 
in Argyris and Schön’s vocabulary. Thus consultants not so much help to improve the 
practice of management, as to engage in a common practice of legitimization. 
A great many researchers (a group to which I belong) do the opposite: attempt to 
describe what is meant by the practical sense and how it is arrived at (in the hope of pro-
voking reflection that might help in its further development) and lay bare the process of 
legitimization (Czarniawska 2001). The practitioners are not amused. Perhaps they are 
right at that: Whereas the implicit knowledge can be made explicit, the explicit formula-
tion of the tacit knowledge is not of much use (pace Schön). Whoever learned to swim by 
reading the manual? If so, what is the management and organization theory good for?
Management theory and practice at the crossroads
Over a hundred years ago our forefathers (plus Mary Follet) began forming the subject 
that later acquired a variety of names; they did so on the promise to solve any prob-
lems that companies and administrative organizations might possibly have. Later, this 
role of ‘company doctor’ was further developed, especially by the Tavistock Institute, 
which was given large sums of money by the British government to help all companies 
facing trouble in post-war Great Britain. Researchers arrived, and like car mechanics 
or physicians, they examined the ‘body’ of the organization, made a diagnosis, and 
prescribed a cure. At the same time, however, this kind of knowledge was becoming 
a strictly academic subject, with PhDs and professors, refereed journals, and interna-
tional conferences.
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Where is management and organization theory now? Is it a practical subject that 
produces practitioners and improves practice, or is it an academic discipline eager to 
establish for itself a decent position within social sciences? Once, when bemoaning a 
lack of interest from practitioners in front of an US audience, I met with the response 
that there was nothing to worry about: After all, there are so many doctoral students 
to teach! The scholars now seem to be divided in three groups: those who opt for the 
former (teaching practical skills and acting as consultants); those who opt for the latter 
(addressing themselves only to the academy); and a third group, perhaps the least nu-
merous, comprising those who still have a vision of a hybrid discipline in close contact 
with practice—not with the purpose of dictating the order of things, but of reflecting 
and provoking via basic research and theory. 
Certainly, the ‘company doctor’s’ role needs to be redefined. After all, it is a strange 
idea that researchers from outside an organization can tell practitioners how to run their 
companies and how to be better managers; that these ‘experts’ are expected to reform 
and reorganize living organizations. If researchers are so good at organizational action, 
one might well ask why they are wasting their talents on academia. And yet this assump-
tion has persisted since the birth of this discipline. The discipline had, after all, made an 
oath to its practical utility. Does it still hold?
When Plato laid the foundations for western philosophy, he promised the Athenian 
politicians to solve any problem that might arise: from guidelines as to how to conquer 
Sparta to methods for raising one’s sons (no feminist, our Plato). When Durkheim laid 
the foundations for modern sociology, he promised to solve every problem of French 
society, from German neighbors to poverty and crime. Both disciplines have ended up at 
an advanced theoretical stage while the practical problems have multiplied, if anything. 
Should one conclude that all those promises were hypocritical, made with the intention 
of justifying oneself to society on false premises?
Indeed they were a means of justification (all practices must be legitimate in demo-
cratic societies); however, those promises were born not out of hypocrisy, but out of enthu-
siasm and naiveté—so typical of the coming into existence of new ways of thinking. That 
which once was enthusiasm and exalted optimism, with time turns into frustration if things 
go wrong, and wisdom if things go right. Full of optimism, I wrote on the subject in 1999:
Things have gone rather well for business and management sciences, which means that 
we are now in the position to afford some reflection upon what we are doing and why. If 
we are a practical subject devoid of intellectual ambition, then it is time to stop wasting 
society’s funds: back to schools of commerce and to two-month correspondence courses 
in accounting and business techniques. If we are an academic discipline however, we must 
ask ourselves what could be our contribution to the general debate concerning the desired 
shape of our society in the twenty-first century. (Czarniawska 1999, pp. 6–7)
At that time, I believed that the desired direction lay in further legitimization of the 
reflection on practice (Czarniawska 2001). After all, such reflection is already legitimate 
in art and literature, where insightful descriptions of the process of creation are as valid 
as stylized stories. Such legitimation, I believed, requires a further development of the 
theory of practice. 
I am no longer sure about this. ‘A further development of the theory of practice’ may 
mean a further step away from the practice of management, toward increased abstraction 
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and the continued autopoiesis of the practice of theory. While inevitable (science is as au-
topoietic as any other communication system), the increased abstraction does not have to 
be all there is. The DNA of the social sciences is richer than that. I still believe in my second 
recommendation from a decade ago—that of a redefinition of the role of the field research-
ers. When in the field, they could act as kind of therapists, facilitating the practitioners’ 
self-reflection—possibly as irritants, just like professional consultants. Their reports, how-
ever, and herein lies the novelty, would not be targeted at the same group of practitioners. 
As Latour (1993) pointed out, if one’s fieldwork was done well, the practitioners already 
knew what was written, even if before this knowledge was only that tacit reflection Schön 
spoke about. The researchers’ aim would be to show how both the practical sense and the 
representations of a given practice are being constructed and/or acquired, so that other 
practitioners (including researchers) could learn from such ‘stories from afar.’ It would 
obviously have a demystifying effect, but not all practitioners wish to remain mystified.
The present irritation of practitioners seems to stem from their conviction that 
revealing the construction of representation would be damaging to their legitimation at-
tempts. Such were the fears expressed by some natural scientists when the sociology of 
science and technology started to describe how they produce facts in their laboratories 
(Knorr Cetina 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1979/1986). It does not seem, however, that 
the financing of laboratories diminished after such works became accessible, while the 
general understanding of ‘laboratory work’ significantly increased. There appears to exist 
a vicious circle of underestimating ‘the Other’: Managers think politicians must remain 
under the illusion, politicians think the voters must remain under the illusion, researchers 
think practitioners should remain under the illusion, and journalists think we all should 
remain under the illusion that the world is simpler than it is. According to my proposal, 
theoreticians will be offering a picture of a practice that will enrich a general knowledge 
of that practice, rather than competing with consultants in trying to improve it directly.
I am not sure that it will work. My hope lies still with the analogy to literature. I 
strongly doubt that the writers learn to write better from reading literary criticism, but I 
know that readers reach for it seeking help and guidance in their choices. And as a ‘criti-
cal management theory’ already exists, I need to specify what I mean by criticism. The 
adjective ‘critical’ has in English two meanings:
crit-i-cal (adj)
1.  tending to find fault with a particular person or thing, or with people and things in 
general
2.  containing or involving comments and opinions that analyze or judge something, espe-
cially in a detailed way (http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/Dictionar-
yResults.aspx?lextype=3&search=critical)
I opt for the second meaning of the word (Czarniawska 2010). My favorite analogy is 
that between a management researcher and a theater critic:
We can opt for what we ourselves like best, or prompt the directors to keep the public 
happy, or to keep it on its toes. In the long run, however, we should be able to present some 
more systematic reflections on the organizational theatre. It would be interesting to be able 
to follow the rise and the fall of the ‘favourites’ in the social consciousness, to see when 
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and how people reach into the repertoire of roles to exchange the last favorite for a new 
one. Organization research can try to evaluate contemporary performances and to build a 
theory of organizational theatre in a historical perspective. (Czarniawska 1993/2006, p. 44)
Such a stance requires a closeness to the practice of management, while keeping enough 
distance in order to be able to problematize it, rather than theorizing it still further. Re-
member the non-negligible hostility of both writers and critics to the ‘literary theory.’ By 
offering ‘stories from afar,’ management scholars may be of help—to managers and their 
subordinates—in shaking free from absurdities that are not of their making, and in jus-
tifying the seeming absurdities that are of their making. By presenting the accurate and 
detailed images of managerial practices taken from the field to the general public, man-
agement scholars may help young people to decide about their future careers—perhaps 
as worthy an achievement as striving to become a ‘company doctor’—if not as lucrative.
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End notes
1  At the “Practice-based theory” seminar (Warwick Business School, 3-5 September 2014) 
where this text was first presented, Theodore Schatzki told me that the title of their book 
was chosen by the publisher, in spite of the protests of the editors.
2  Later, Argyris et al. (1985, p. 81) suggested an interesting distinction, which they did not 
develop further. Theories of action held by the actors are theories of control (‘how to’); 
theories of action composed by observers are theories of explanation (‘how do’). 
3  Here, Schön would have disagreed, but he did notice the tendency of systems to self-repro-
duce themselves. Thus the need for the special training—or for the consultants’ help.
4  It needs to be pointed out that although the title of Bourdieu’s book in English is The Logic 
of Practice (1990), the French book has a title Le sens pratique (1980), quite another matter, 
in my reading. Thus it can be said that consultants do not instruct practitioners in the logic 
of practice, but train their practical sense.
